


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REPORT

Thoughts on the State of Intelligence Studies: A Survey Report

LOCH K. JOHNSON* AND ALLISON M. SHELTON

In 2012, we – the North American editors of *Intelligence and National Security* – solicited by email opinions from members of the journal's editorial board about the state of intelligence studies. This report summarizes the central findings of the survey. The purpose is to stimulate further discussion on this topic among *INS* readers and contributors. The questions we posed are presented in bold below, followed by a summation of the various answers we received.

1. What is the principal debate in contemporary intelligence studies?

The respondents displayed wide variation in their responses to this initial question, underscoring the diversity of views about the field of intelligence studies. Most rejected the notion that a single principal debate dominates the field. 'Some [of the debates] are historical, some are theoretical, and some are more "hands on"', replied David M. Barrett of Villanova University. On the historical front, he offered this question as an illustration: 'Could a better performance by intelligence agencies have prevented September 11th?' For theory: 'Which social science theories are best suited to doing intelligence studies?' For 'hands on': 'Does the Director of National Intelligence [DNI] in the United States have adequate power?' Robert Jervis of Columbia University also commented on the lack of coalescence around a specific debate in the field. 'This is both good and bad', he said. 'Bad because debates can increase focus and interest, but good because they can become narrowing, if not solipsistic'. Michael Herman of Oxford University further downplayed the importance of the definitional debate. He suggested that we 'think of the subject [intelligence studies] as a mixture of history and the

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study of intelligence institutions, and what they do, and not worry further about boundaries’.

Others argued that a central debate does in fact exist, especially around the fundamental question of what intelligence studies actually is. ‘I take intelligence studies to be a broad umbrella term covering an essentially multi-disciplinary subject area’, noted Mark Phythian at the University of Leicester. ‘Within this, it is also an area of enquiry that encourages inter-disciplinary thinking – for example, in the way in which approaches from the disciplines of political science, sociology, and criminology can be used in developing a distinctive social science framework for the study of intelligence’. For Gregory F. Treverton at the RAND Corporation, an ‘in-and-outer’ with government service on the National Intelligence Council and on the Church Committee, ‘the central debate, after all these years, is over what intelligence is’. He referred to a dichotomy between information and secrets: ‘My view is, and long has been, that [intelligence] is information and assessment, not just – or even primarily – secrets’.

Beyond the questions of definitions, survey respondents identified a number of other debates in the field. For example, Phythian identified these topics:

... the reasons for intelligence failure; the nature of ‘politicization’; the role and optimal structure of intelligence oversight; the relationship between intelligence and ethics; and the relationship between intelligence and the state, including the question of the extent to which intelligence is an outgrowth of national political cultures or how far it helps define these cultures.

William Nolte’s ‘great concern’ was ‘the issue of theory versus practice, or of scholars versus practitioners’. He has served as both an officer in the National Security Agency (NSA) and as a faculty member at the University of Maryland. Based on these experiences, he is critical of the strained relationship between the two groups. As examples, he pointed in the survey to the imbalance of participation on intelligence panels at the International Studies Association (ISA), in favor of academics; and on the faculty of his own School of Public Policy, which is also short on practitioners. He laments, too, the sometimes arcane and esoteric methodologies adopted in academe that separate the ivy tower from the government’s secret agencies.

Another scholar/practitioner, Mark M. Lowenthal emphasized in his responses that there is not just one principal debate in the field but several. Among them, in his view, is the contentious argument ‘between those academic programs that focus on [teaching] analytic skills, versus those that believe the basis of a good analyst is knowledge or expertise’. In company with Nolte, he located himself firmly in the camp of knowledge and expertise. ‘Analysts get hired’, Lowenthal stated, ‘because they know something, not because they know how to do something’.

Sir David Omand, also a well-known scholar/practitioner, proposed another candidate for the roster of ‘principal debates’ – the question of whether intelligence is:

... a social phenomenon with characteristics that can be modeled to provide a 'theory of intelligence'; or whether it is essentially an historically-based discipline examining how policy-makers and military commanders have been influenced (or not) by the intelligence made available to them and, thus, deriving practical lessons for better decision-taking for the future.

He was more sympathetic to the latter approach.

Rose McDermott of Brown University, a relative newcomer to the *INS* board and to the study of intelligence, saw with fresh eyes a field that seemed preoccupied with, first, the question of intelligence politicization – especially 'US intelligence susceptibility to such pressure'; and, second, the sheer volume of intelligence faced by analysts and policy-makers and how best to separate the 'wheat' from the 'chaff'. She underscored how this long-standing fire-hose challenge 'becomes more intense as more signals intelligence becomes available'. She noted, further, that this increasing attention to sigint and other forms of intelligence collection raises worrisome privacy questions. The matter of civil liberties struck a cord, as well, with Arne Kislenko of Ryerson University and the University of Toronto. He observed:

I think there are slight variations from country to country, but that generally the principal debate in pluralistic democracies is about how best to balance national security concerns with civil liberties. My position is that government and their publics need to be ever vigilant about excessive encroachments on those liberties; but that, in an era of increasing national security threats, individual rights are being slowly eroded.

Len Scott of Aberystwyth University rejected the notion of a single debate; nonetheless, he considered one conflict especially prominent: the tension between human rights and civil liberties, on the one hand, and counter-terrorism practices, on the other hand. Taking sides in this debate, he wrote that 'human rights should not be sacrificed to perceived short-term security interests'. In a similar vein, Anthony Glees of University of Buckingham pointed with emphasis to the debate that revolves around 'the political accountability and the political oversight of secret intelligence agencies'. He underscored, as well, the importance of 'accountability and competence in terms of tradecraft, political skills, and ethical values'.

A. Walter Dorn of the Canadian Forces College agreed with those who thought the relationship between secret agencies and civil society is the principal – indeed, he argued, the 'essential' – debate in the field. His concerns included 'the proper limits of intelligence-gathering methods and intelligence-sharing in democracies, especially with the media'. As a specialist on the use of intelligence by the United Nations, he added that 'another key debate is the relationship between national and international security'. His research has led him to believe 'there's a lot to study, and even more to do, to make the UN an effective instrument and a suitable intelligence player'.

Definitions of intelligence, the proper scope of the field, useful methodologies, accountability versus efficiencies, tradecraft, ethics – this partial list of ‘principal debates’ (the pages of *International and National Security* offer still more candidates) indicate a lively, protean, and evolving research agenda that invites all hands on deck to advance knowledge in this once neglected domain of scholarship. From the rich menu, several members of the editorial board expressed definite ideas about the most promising research directions, as shown in their responses to the second survey question.

2. What are the most over- and under-researched topics of research in the field of intelligence studies?

A few of the survey respondents concluded that so much about intelligence remains to be learned (we suffer from a ‘relative paucity’ of research in this area, Jervis wrote) that no topic qualifies as over-researched. Most board members, though, nominated specific topics which they thought had garnered sufficient attention already. Chief among them were: the effectiveness of spying during the Cold War; the Cuban missile crisis; intelligence ‘surprises’; the infamous October 2002 NIE on Iraq; terrorism; organizational dilemmas; covert action; theories of intelligence, especially related to analysis; sigint – especially, Omand emphasized, ‘the signals intelligence work carried out at Bletchley Part during the Second World War’; interactions between the consumers and producers of intelligence; and – a theoretical construct always sure to elicit strong views, pro and con – the intelligence cycle. Glees thought the lack of evidence on intelligence available to scholars may have led to over-theorization in the field. He referred to a parallel development in political science, which (in his view) ‘has taken away from the meaningful analysis of real political problems, and away from doing social good, into a narcissistic fascination with theories that have little if anything to do with real-life politics’.

There was anything but unanimity, however, on the question of what topics have attracted too much research attention from intelligence scholars. Scott, for instance, proposed *more* research on sigint; so did Treverton. Moreover, Scott looked upon research on intelligence failures as a subject that remained ‘clearly important’ and was likely to stay that way as failures continued to occur – inevitably – from time to time. Further, the idea of halting research on intelligence and terrorism, in the middle of a worldwide struggle against Al Qaeda and its associates, would strike many in the field as short-sighted. The ambiguity surrounding the authority of the DNI in the United States is certainly bound to keep the intelligence organizational literature alive and well, too; and, since the 9/11 attacks, covert action as a practice and as a research focus has sputtered to life again, like a dormant engine suddenly given several quarts of oil. This renewal is driven not least by the escalating CIA drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. Moreover, despite the ennui – not to say irritation – some may experience when the phrase ‘intelligence cycle’ is mentioned, the 2012 ISA meetings sponsored an entire panel on the subject. The cycle construct is also the focus

of a forthcoming book, with chapters by several of the leading lights in the field. In short, opinion is conflicted over which research topics should be placed on the shelf and which warrant further notice.

As for under-researched subjects, the respondents produced a file cabinet worth of proposals. Leading the list was a call for more digging into intelligence practices in developing nations, as scholars attempt to move away from the Anglo-American research fixation. Of interest, too, are: why governments are so tight-fisted in sharing even non-sensitive national security information with scholars; the old standbys of counterintelligence and sigint; how personal characteristics of individual analysts affect analytical quality; non-traditional threat assessments, such as forecasting the occurrence of natural disasters; the interface between collectors and analysts (not just producers and consumers); and intelligence procedures in international organizations. Scott expressed specific concern about the 'absence of systematic scrutiny of where estimates reach the right conclusions for the wrong reasons'.

On the matter of estimates and related forms of analysis, both Richard K. Betts and Jervis would like to see more work regarding the effects on policy that can be attributed directly to intelligence. As Jervis put it:

We perhaps are under-researched on the central question of the influence of intelligence on policy. Indeed, thanks to the interest spurred by the Iraq WMD case, we may know more about the influence of policy on intelligence than the other way around. Both, of course, can occur and perhaps the combination is the core of the field.

Adding another suggestion for future research, Nolte recommended more thought to the fundamental question of 'where intelligence studies fits' into the broader scope of scholarly endeavors.

Herman brought up the need for a typology of intelligence systems worldwide, along with research that sets intelligence properly into the context of a government information service. As well, he advocated greater attention to findings in the disciplines of economic and management studies that are likely applicable to intelligence organizations. Phythian was heartened by the wide-open possibilities for research in the field. 'One of the attractions of intelligence studies', he stressed, 'is the way in which it still represents a relatively blank canvas on which to apply new approaches to the discussion of core problems'. He noted that the field 'is still characterized more by gaps in knowledge and understanding than by a consensus that the subject has arrived at definitive or convincing answers'. In the next survey question, we probed further into these perceived gaps.

3. What are the major gaps in the literature on intelligence studies?

Again, we see significant diversity among the responses to this question. Phythian offered up the comparative study of intelligence as an example of a key research gap. 'We do not have enough information on a range of national cultures of intelligence for comprehensive comparative analysis', he remarked,

pointing to all of Africa and large parts of Asia as illustrations. Omand agreed and placed China, India, Brazil, Japan and other Asian nations on the list for more comparative analysis. Scott put into the research pot the need for more studies on Soviet Cold War and contemporary Russian intelligence. Underlining a methodological consideration, Jervis recommended comparative analysis as an important means 'for getting at causation'. Further, he called attention to a fact that intelligence scholars know all too well, but one that needs to be stated in any discussion of research gaps: namely, that the lacunae are often the result of heavy classification restrictions imposed by governments to conceal such intelligence activities as information-sharing, covert action, and the links between information sources (especially humint) and finished intelligence. McDermott expressed another methodological recommendation: the desirability of more quantitative work in the field. She wrote that 'sometimes being able to see repetitions across time and space can help identify places where improvements can be made or successes can be built upon'. Barrett concurred: 'Quantitative methods sometimes are valuable in many subfields, even including the presidency. Why not intel studies?'

For Nolte, the heart of the matter when it comes to gaps was the unresolved problem of how to evaluate intelligence. He asked: 'When does it work? How would we know? What is it worth?' Lowenthal reinforced this theme: 'We need a reasonable standard for what constitutes "good intelligence" and what constitutes real "failure"'. Lowenthal also thinks we need more research on what an analyst's career progression should look like, and what skills should be acquired along the way. Other candidates for gap-filling included: more scholarly probes into intelligence-sharing between the United States, NATO, and Western members of the UN (say, with respect to the civil war in Syria); border security issues; intelligence on organized crime; and the possible national security consequences stemming from climate changes and other ecological conditions. Barrett reminded us, too, that 'a lot of intel history remains mostly untold, despite all the historical literature'.

Next the survey examined opinions about the interaction, if any, between intelligence scholarship and intelligence policy-making.

4. How would you characterize the current relationship between intelligence studies, on the one hand, and intelligence policy-making, on the other hand?

Lowenthal minces no words on the relationship. 'Most intelligence policy-makers are far removed from intelligence studies', he replied. 'They haven't the time, and many of them would disdain reading anything they deem as "academic"'. Dorn agreed. 'Practitioners don't have enough time (or interest) to read much of what of what scholars produce', he said. 'Furthermore, they rarely give feedback on what they do read. However, there is mutual respect'. McDermott thought, as well, that 'many of the studies scholars do just simply don't seem timely or relevant to policy-makers'. Just as Hans Morganthau observed about international relations (IR) research some 60 years ago, she suggested that today 'policy serves as fodder for scholarship, but not the reverse'.

Jervis, though, has had a different experience, no doubt a result, in part, of his work for the intelligence community as an outside consultant over the years. 'Unlike other fields of political and policy studies', he wrote, '[intelligence] professionals are interested in what the scholars have to say, and the scholars treat the practitioners with real respect'. Some intelligence scholars, including several *INS* board members, have moved back-and-forth between academe and the government, carrying with them knowledge of the intelligence studies literature. Betts noted, further, that – although the overall relationship between intelligence scholarship and policy remains unclear – some of this academic literature is used in intelligence community training programs.

On the other side of the pond, Omand wrote that in the United Kingdom there is little by way of direct intelligence studies influence on intelligence policy-making, with the exception of 'the drafting of British military intelligence doctrine, where academics have been closely involved; and in the staff college teaching of young officers, where intelligence scholars are often used'. Phythian was skeptical about this relationship in the United Kingdom. Until recently, he found it 'marked by distance and suspicion'. Over the past decade, however, the ties have grown closer. 'Academics have been invited to write official intelligence histories and have been given access to agency archives to do this', he pointed out. 'At the same time, intelligence agencies have been increasingly willing to engage in conversations with groups of academics'. Moreover, Scott recalled how some British intelligence scholars have been tapped to undertake official or authorized histories, and some have won sizeable government grants to study intelligence. For the most part, though, Scott continued, the interests of 'officialdom' (policy-makers) in the United Kingdom 'lie primarily in specialized products of academe (linguists and IT specialists, for example), rather than those who spend their time studying officialdom'.

Next, the survey explored the relationship between intelligence research and the reporting of journalists.

5. How would you characterize the relationship between intelligence scholars and journalists with an intelligence beat?

Phythian noted that few journalists in the United Kingdom have an intelligence beat, but that the relationship of scholars with those who do is 'mutually supportive and helpful'. Omand agreed that British journalists 'do seek relationships with intelligence scholars for material... and the results seem positive'. In the United States, Jervis observed a more tenuous relationship, criticizing some American journalists (though certainly not all) for being 'quite superficial' on this subject. The British journalist Gordon Corera and the American journalists David Ignatius and Scott Shane received special praise from some of the respondents for their deeper knowledge about the subject. One respondent said that he was in weekly contact with journalists covering defense and security issues; another, who is widely quoted in the American media, has felt something of an obligation to help

journalists report on this topic to the public, since most of them know ‘nothing about intelligence until they come on the beat’. Scott concluded that ‘intelligence journalists have always been a prominent part of the UK study [of intelligence], and their work is a major contribution to understanding and popular engagement’.

With the next question, the survey asked board members to look forward, pondering challenges to the field.

6. What do you see as the greatest challenge facing intelligence studies today, and how might this challenge be met?

A broad consensus existed among respondents about the central challenge facing intelligence scholars. Lowenthal stated the matter succinctly: ‘The greatest challenge is gaining acceptance in academia for intelligence as a legitimate field of study and knowledge, distinct from a course or two in the Poli Sci department’. He is optimistic this will happen, ‘especially as the senior faculty who were in grad school in the ’60s retire and take their prejudices with them’. Perhaps, but these near-retirees seem to have trained many young progeny with their same prejudices. Eventually, though, Lowenthal is likely to be correct: reputable scholars will need to take into account the importance of intelligence in key foreign policy decisions, as well as the contribution of the secret agencies to dominant battlefield awareness (DBA, in Pentagonese) and the resulting lower war casualties among those nations with modern intelligence capabilities. In photographs taken inside the White House Situation Room during the deliberations that preceded inside the attack against Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, DNI James R. Clapper, Jr, and CIA Director Leon Panetta are seated close to the President – a rare glimpse into the importance of intelligence in high councils, even if the topic continues to be largely ignored in most American college textbooks. As Trevorton suggested in the survey, realists – who continue to be the dominant theorists in international relations – should be (among others) interested in whether intelligence has made a difference in the competition among nations.

McDermott speculated on why intelligence studies remains largely ‘in a rarefied enclave’. Her impression was that ‘liberal academics associate intelligence studies with political conservatism and that is the unspoken source of the distaste’. This could well be true, although a significant portion of the intelligence studies community has liberal political leanings and a deep interest in such topics as civil liberties, privacy, and accountability – not just collection-and-analysis efficiencies, counterintelligence, and covert action.

Jervis summed up much of the sentiment on this topic of challenges with the observation that ‘the field is understandably pulled in two quite different, if not opposite, directions’. He explained:

On the one hand, there are good reasons for it to develop into a field unto itself, with scholars in the area looking inward at what their colleagues are writing. The field is arcane, a great deal of specialized knowledge is needed, and at this point it is healthily interdisciplinary, with political

scientists, historians, organization theorists, sociologists, and psychologist all involved, in addition to those who work in areas that require special scientific expertise. Developing a good dialogue among people in different disciplines is valuable, difficult, and takes a great deal of time and intellectual energy. On the other hand, this inward focus cuts us off from the intellectual trends in the home disciplines. As it is now, intelligence studies is marginalized by most, if not all, academic fields.

This former president of the American Political Science Association went on to say that he would have trouble imagining his own political science department at Columbia University hiring someone with an intelligence specialization. In his view, such a person would be much more likely to be recruited by a public policy school.

Despite its relative isolation from the social science mainstream, Nolte sounded an optimistic note about the state of the field. 'This is a happy time for intelligence studies', he said. 'Students fill our classes. Much of the climate of the 1960s and 1970s has dissipated, at least in terms of hostility to intelligence and national security'. On a further promising note, Scott observed that in the United Kingdom 'a new generation of highly able young scholars' is entering the field of intelligence studies.

Toward achieving greater acceptance as an academic discipline, respondents offered several suggestions for scholars of intelligence studies. Treverton saw the challenge as defining the field more exactly and becoming, if not more 'scientific', at least more rigorous. Kislenco urged the establishment of 'permanent, mutually beneficial connections between academia and practitioners'. For Dorn, it was important not to consider the United States 'the centre of the universe' in the study of intelligence; he hoped for a greater 'multilateralizing' of the field. Further, Glees recommended that the community of intelligence scholars 'work together more systematically and less hierarchically', as a way of surmounting intellectual isolation. He hoped to see, as well, the establishment of more intelligence workshops and study groups, along with smaller conferences on intelligence.

A second major obstacle mentioned by respondents is the ever-present problem of secrecy – the primary vexation to those engaged in studying the hidden side of governments. 'The greatest challenge is the same as ever', wrote Betts: 'how to do systematic social science analysis when a big portion of relevant data is secret'. We are not alone in this regard, Phythian stressed, referring to the field of strategic studies as one of several examples of intellectual endeavors that face the thick veils of government classification systems. He offered this soothing balm: at least we don't have to defend the relevance of the field. 'It is not a subject of only minor state investment', he said. 'It does not face the challenge of proving that it is globally applicable. Far from being a niche concern, it is one that all citizens should share'.

The survey pursued this line of thought with a follow-up question about whether intelligence studies was ever likely to be considered a major intellectual endeavor by the broader stream of scholars in the established academic disciplines.

7. Do you think that intelligence studies will ever become a mainstream topic in the larger disciplines of international relations, political science, and history?

Jervis was skeptical that this will ever happen. 'Political science and international politics is becoming dominated by those who do statistical analyses of large datasets, and by scholars who construct formal models borrowed from economics', he wrote, cautioning: 'Neither of these approaches is well-suited to most questions of intelligence'. Offering a British perspective, Omand considered intelligence studies already mainstream; however, he tempered this evaluation with the caveat that the field 'will never be on a par with the disciplines mentioned in the question, because intelligence is in the real world a subsidiary craft in the service of better decision-making in these larger domains'. He referred to the analogy of war studies, which is a subset of IR, political science, and history (with an intelligence studies a component as well): 'There are not neat boundaries!'

For Phythian, the rise of intelligence studies toward the status as a well-respected and recognized field has been 'a gradual process'. Nevertheless, the field is well on its way to achieving this objective, in his view. 'This development has had to await the production of a foundational literature, generating a common language and identifying key component areas of study and debate', he observed, concluding that 'this is now largely in place'. From Nolte's vantage point, the ongoing integration of intelligence studies into international relations, political science, and history was 'inevitable'. Kislenco also envisioned field integration. 'I don't think it's possible, or even wise, to have the field wholly distinct from [IR, political science, and history], as they provide much context and background necessary for the proper understanding of everything intelligence-related'.

For both Jervis and Nolte, information is the concept that intelligence studies contributes above all to the traditional IR literature. Nolte posited that intelligence is 'simply information applied to a decision process'. As a result, 'one must come pretty close to agreeing with Thomas Stewart that information will be to the twenty-first century what oil was to the twentieth century: the indispensable resource'. Jervis acknowledged that IR scholars have begun to concentrate more on the role of information and, in principle, 'this could have an interesting overlap with intelligence studies'. The problem, he concluded, is that IR scholars who adopt this information approach often 'treat information quite abstractly, if not mechanistically'.

The next question in the survey, about the quantification of intelligence studies, brought forth passionate responses.

8. Should the quantitative methods of the social sciences be adopted by intelligence scholars, and are there some aspects of intelligence studies where this approach would be most suitable?

For Lowenthal, this was a no-brainer. His response: 'No, no, no no!!!' He conceded that some intelligence questions (for example, those related to

economics and physics) may require quantitative skills. Nevertheless, he wrote: 'I cannot see how this gets applied across the board. Indeed, one of the biggest problems in the intel profession (i.e. government) is the over-reliance on data, which are easy – versus thinking, which is difficult'. Lowenthal continued: 'As a senior military commander told me recently: "I do not want data; I want knowledge and insight"'. Nolte is equally skeptical about quantitative applications to intelligence studies. 'I believe the decline of political science and other fields in their impact on policy', he maintained, 'has been directly related to a methodological, quantitative emphasis that simple does not translate into the policy field, where subjective – even personal considerations – matter so greatly'. Nor did the British political scientist Phythian embrace quantification as a priority, in part because secrecy creates significant problems related to data acquisition and the reliability of data.

In contrast – and with fighting words – one respondent from the numbers camp opined that 'quantitative analysis reveals truths in ways that mere history writing cannot'. More diplomatically, Jervis advocated a role for some quantitative studies in the field, too, although he pointed to the current lack of data available for this kind of analysis. 'I'd love to see articles that tried this', he wrote, 'and I expect that some industrious, and I hope ingenious, person will give it a shot – but it will be difficult'.

Some respondents argued that quantitative methodologies could be applied thoughtfully in at least some areas of intelligence studies. For example, Scott envisioned public opinion research on intelligence questions as one such issue area. Suggesting a way of expanding academic interest in intelligence studies, McDermott offered this perspective: 'I do not think that quantitative works need to be central; but I do think that, to the extent data exist in this form and can be made available to the wider political science community, it will spur those quantitative scholars always trolling for data to become more interested and engaged in intelligence work and questions'. Treverton, as well, would like to see more attention to quantitative research by scholars of intelligence studies. 'Surely the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, as well as studies of it, could make much more use of data and quantitative methods', he stressed, while acknowledging that 'to be sure, data are often bad and incomplete'. His bottom line: 'often there are much more data out there than gets used'. Perhaps, but Omand sounded this note of caution: 'What works for economics with the "law of large numbers" to underpin statistics is unlikely to be meaningful in the small domains of intelligence, where non-quantitative factors dominate'.

The final question in the survey dealt with possible ways to elevate the quality of the journal *Intelligence and National Security*.

9. How might the journal *Intelligence and National Security* be improved?

As editors, we were pleased to see that the responding members of the editorial board expressed pride in the journal's performance to date. Some opportunities for improvement exist, though. Here are the main suggestions from respondents:

- Conduct annual reviews involving the Editorial Board, with an eye toward developing possible points of emphasis for the coming year or two; that is, use the Board strategically, not just tactically.
- Introduce a fast-track referee system for articles that are highly topical; encourage the writing of articles on 'gaps', such as Asian intelligence services.
- Try to reduce the cost of the journal for libraries.
- Seek a better balance between historical pieces and articles about the profession and its tradecraft.
- Incorporate an occasional forum section, where the editors throw out a current question to a number of individuals, as a means of fostering debate.
- Publish more articles about intelligence outside the Anglo-American domain.
- Focus the book review section more on intelligence-related issues.
- Vary the cover illustration; use larger type for the cover and the contents page; and incorporate more tables and figures into the articles.

We appreciate these reform ideas and we will work with our counterpart editors in the United Kingdom to pursue improvements in future issues of the journal.

We want to express our deep gratitude to participating board members for their survey responses, which were uniformly thoughtful and helpful. We will let their responses speak for themselves and add only a few closing comments, based on our reading of the survey results. We conclude that important work is being done in the field, which eventually will be more broadly recognized in both academe and government. The field remains in flux and, as a result, it is an exciting place to be for anyone with a pioneer spirit. Finally, all of us involved in these endeavors should consider ourselves lucky. We have the privilege of shaping an academic discipline while, at the same time, trying to improve the capacity of the democracies to protect themselves and make better decisions in a world that remains dangerous and uncertain.

Notes on Contributors

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